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Third Party Plaintiffs/Appellants 
vs. 
GLEN H. CALDER and JOHN DOE WILSON, 
individually and d/b/a 
WILSON & CALDER, 
Third Party Defendants/Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Third Party Defendant and Respondent Glen H. Calder 
("Respondent Calder"), by and through its counsel of record, 
hereby submits this Brief. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3), (1953, as amended). 
Respondent Calder brought a Motion for Summary Judgment 
before the lower court, seeking to have the Third Party Complaint 
filed by the Third Party Plaintiffs and Appellants ("Appellants") 
dismissed, based on the running of the statute of limitations. (R. 
74). Seventh District Court Judge Dennis Draney, following the 
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration by Respondent Calder, 
dismissed the Third Party Complaint. (R. 129, 130). The court 
ruling, dated June 17, 1987, provided that: the cause of action in 
the instant matter was for negligence, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-12-25(2) (1053, as amended) governs negligence actions, 
the last action necessary to complete the cause of action occurred 
in May, 1972, when Respondent Calder signed the survey and the 
discovery requirement of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26(3) 
does not apply to a cause of action in negligence. (R. 129, 130). 
(A copy of the ruling is in the Addendum.) 
The original action filed in this matter was tried before the 
court on June 23, 1987. (R. 166, 167). The Plaintiffs prevailed 
pursuant to the Ruling of the Judge signed June 24, 19, which 
Ruling was filed with the court on July 6, 1987. (R. 146, 147). 
A Judgment, provided pursuant to Rules of Practice, Rule 2.9, was 
filed with the court on August (R. 154). Appellant filed a Motion 
for New Trial with the court on August 13, 1987. (R. 173). The 
Order denying Appellants1 Motion for New Trial was filed with the 
court on December 3, 1987 and Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal 
on December 28, 1987. (R. 200-203). 
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Appellants apparently reached a settlement agreement with 
Plaintiffs, and the only issues to be reviewed by this Court are 
those issues related to the lower court's dismissal of Appellants' 
Third Party Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the claim of Appellants, brought fourteen years after 
Calder signed the survey relating to Appellant's land and which 
constituted the last act necessary to complete the alleged cause 
of action in negligence against Respondent Calder, is barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
CONTROLLING STATUTE 
The controlling statute in this matter is Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-12-25(2) (1953, as amended), which provides 
that actions for relief not otherwise provided for by law should 
be brought within four years. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1971, Appellants purchased 30 acres of property from 
Strawberry River Estates located in Duchesne County, Utah. (T. 
393, 394). Appellants later purchased an additional 10 acres from 
Strawberry River Estates. (T. 395-397). Appellants then contacted 
and hired the firm of Wilson & Calder to survey the property. (T. 
399-400). Wilson & Calder surveyed the property and provided 
Appellants with a Certificate of Survey related to the property. 
(R. 413, 414). This Certificate of Survey was signed by Glen 
Calder, on behalf of Wilson & Calder, on May 15, 1972. (R. 5, 140) 
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(A copy of the Certificate of Survey is in the Addendum to this 
Brief.) 
Appellants sold the property to the Plaintiffs in this action 
in July, 1983. (T. 327). Sometime in February, 1985, the 
Plaintiffs discovered there was a problemi with the boundaries of 
the subject property. (T.432-433). Plaintiffs commenced this 
action against Appellants, in the end, alleging mutual mistake and 
seeking rescission of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. (R. 135-
140). As previously stated, Appellants filed a Third Party 
Complaint alleging negligence in the preparation of the survey of 
the subject property and it is the dismissal of said action which 
is the subject of this appeal. (R. 15-19). 
SUMMARY OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
The trial court's decision to dismiss the Third Party 
Complaint based on the running of the statute of limitations 
relating to negligence should be upheld by this Court. The 
alleged cause of action was for negligence, and the statute of 
limitations for negligence requires that such actions be brought 
within four years. Appellants contention that Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-12-26(3) relating to actions based on fraud 
or mistake is the "Determinative Statute" is in error. 
Next, the lower court's determination that the last act 
necessary to complete the alleged cause of action was Calder?s 
signing of the Certificate of Survey in May, 1972, was correct and 
therefore, as Appellants1 Third Party Complaint was not filed 
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until May 1986, the action was not timely filed and is barred by 
the statute of limitations governing negligence actions. 
The Discovery Rule should not be applied in the instant 
matter as "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action 
does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations." 
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah, 1981). Further, the 
instant action does not fall within the exceptions to the 
Discovery Rule. 
Dismissal of this action through Summary Judgement was 
appropriate. In the alternative, Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-
12-25(1), Section 78-12-25.5 or Section 78-12-26(1) may apply to 
the case at bar and application of any of these sections would 
also bar Appellants' claim. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. The Lower Court Correctly Determined that the Instant 
Action be Governed by the Four Year Statute of 
Limitation related to Negligence, Pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-25(2). 
The lower court, in its Ruling, stated: 
Based upon the pleadings and memoranda of Third Party 
Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the cause of action is one 
for negligence. As such it must have been commenced within 
four (4) years as set forth in Section 78-12-25 (2) UCA. 
That Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25(2) is the appropriate 
section for a negligence action such as this is well-settled, 
long-standing Utah law. Thomas v. Union Pacific R.R.Co., 1 Utah 
235, 236 (1875); Albretson v. Judd, 709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985); 
Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980); Hansen v. Petrof 
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Trading Co,, 527 P.2d 116 (Utah 1974); Peteler v. Robison, 17 P.2d 
244 (Utah 1932). 
Notwithstanding the above, Appellants cite Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-12-26(3) as the Determinative Statute and 
request this Court to rule that said section governs the instant 
matter, (Appellants Brief at P.l and 10). Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-12-26(3) provides that actions for relief on the 
grounds of fraud or mistake should be brought within three years, 
with the proviso that the cause of action in such case does not 
accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3) for fraud or mistake is 
inapplicable to the case at bar. Appellants may not contort and 
align their negligence cause of action to sound in fraud or 
mistake to avoid the applicable statute of limitations. "Neither 
the form of the proceeding nor the name applied to it can change 
the nature of the wrong or the injury . . . the statute fixes the 
time within which such an action must be brought. . . . " Reese v. 
Qualtrouqh, 156 P. 955, 959 (Utah 1916). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26(3) is inapplicable in 
that Respondent Calder did not mislead or induce Appellants to 
refrain from bringing suit within the statutory period. There are 
no facts indicating fraud, mistake, concealment or misleading 
actions by Respondent Calder which would activate Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-12-26(3). "Nothing is reflected to indicate 
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low blows, hidden microphones, smokefilled rooms or deception." 
Smoot v. Hydro Flame Corporation, 522 P. 2d 709, 710 (Utah 1974). 
Generally mistake statutes are applied in actions to reform 
deeds and other written instruments. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of 
Actions § 92, 198. Utah law follows this rule. In those cases 
where Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3) was cited for the 
principle of mistake, it was in a fact situation dealing with the 
reformation of a deed or other similar written instrument. Haslem 
v. Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984); Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 
974 (Utah 1982); Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180 (Utah 1975); McKellar 
v. McKellar, 458 P.2d 867 (Utah 1969); Doxey v. Layton, 548 P.2d 
902 (Utah 1976); McKonkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974). 
There was no deed or written instrument between the parties of 
this cause of action to reform through application of the mistake 
doctrine. No Utah case applies the mistake statute of limitations 
to a negligence action as the case at bar. 
Negligence is not the equivalent of mistake. Mistake 
"assumes to know." Fitzgerald v. Morgan, 38 S.E.2d 171, 173 (Ga. 
1946). "It [mistake] is distinguished from . . that inattention 
or absence of thought which are inherent in negligence . 
mistake has nothing in common with negligence. . . . " Callan 
Court Co. v. Citizens & Southern Natf 1 Bank, 190 S.E. 831, 854 
(Ga. 1937). Mistake is a misunderstanding of the truth but 
without negligence. Id. Negligence results from carelessness. 
Matheson v. Pearson, supra. 
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Moreover, the case at bar is not pled as an action for fraud 
and therefore, once more, fails to fall within the ambit of Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3). Even were fraud alleged, it would 
be inapplicable. Negligence is distinguished from "fraud, 
fraudulent representations, or fraudulent concealments, by the 
absence of knowledge and intention, which in legal fraud are 
actually present, and in constructive fraud are theoretically 
present, as necessary elements." Callan, 190 S.E. at 854. 
Fraud or mistake as applied in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-
26(3) is inapplicable to the current action. The basis of 
Appellants' claim in their Third Party Complaint is the alleged 
"negligence and failure of Third Party Defendants' to properly 
survey and locate the subject property." (R. 17, Para. 7). Utah 
courts have always ruled that the applicable statute governing 
negligence claims is Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25(2) (1953, as 
amended). This Court should uphold the lower court's decision 
that said section governing negligence actions applies to the case 
at bar. 
Point II. This Court Should Uphold the Lower Court's Determination 
that the Last Act Necessary to Complete the Cause of 
Action was Calder's Signing of The Survey in May, 1972 
and Likewise Rule that Appellants' Claim is Barred by 
the Statute of Limitations. 
A cause of action accrues upon the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action, Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, 
668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). According to the ruling of the 
lower court, the last action necessary to complete the cause of 
action was Calder's signing of the survey which action occurred in 
8 
May of 1972. (R. 129). As the instant action was not commenced 
until May, 1986, nearly fourteen years after the "last event," 
Appellants' claim is barred by Section 78-12-25(2). 
In Lembert v. Gilbert, 312 A.2d 335, 337 (Del.Ch. 1973), an 
action was brought against a surveyor when the plaintiff 
discovered the survey was inaccurate. The defendant surveyor 
moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that it was not timely 
filed pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. The 
issue before the court was when did the statute of limitations 
begin to run. In this regard, the court concluded that "the 
injury caused by the defendant occurred at the time of placing of 
the surveyor's stakes in 1965 and that the statute of limitations 
commenced to run at that time." Lembert at 337. In making said 
determination, the court had relied on the general rule that "the 
statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the injury 
caused by defendant rather than from the date on which plaintiffs 
became aware or discovered the injury." Id. 
While the exact issue raised in the instant matter has not 
been reviewed by Utah courts, similar issues can provide guidance. 
In Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction, 764 P.2d 1370 
(Utah, 1987), Utah's Supreme Court was asked to determine when the 
cause of action in a construction contract case arose. The 
general rule in such cases is that an "owner's claim of defective 
construction against a general contractor is generally considered 
to accrue on the date the construction is completed." Brigham 
Young at 1373. This rule was adopted by this Court. Likewise 
9 
this Court should rule that an owner's claim against a surveyor is 
considered to accrue on the date the survey is complete. 
In the instant case, the survey was performed in 1972. It is 
not disputed that Respondent Calder signed the Certificate of 
Survey in May, 1972. Such act was the last act related to the 
survey. The Certificate of Survey was referenced in the 
complaints filed by the Plaintiffs as well as the Appellants and 
as such is part of the pleadings on file. (R. 5). 
As the statute of limitations commenced to run at that time 
the Certificate of Survey was signed, Appellants' action brought 
fourteen years after "accrual," is barred by the four year statute 
of limitation for negligence actions. Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-12-25(2). Such a result is also supported by the governing 
policy in this area of the law: "[statutes of limitations] are 
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the 
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence 
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express 
Agency. Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). The lower court 
appropriately dismissed Appellants' Third Party Complaint because 
it was not timely filed and that determination should be upheld by 
this Court. 
Point III: The Discovery Rule Does Not Apply as There are No 
Exceptional Circumstances in the Instant Matter to 
Warrant the Use of the Discovery Rule. 
Appellants could have brought an action for negligence 
against Respondent Calder in 1972, thus, the cause of action 
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accrued at that time. While Appellants argue that the cause of 
action did not arise until discovery of the alleged negligence, 
"Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not 
prevent the running of the statute of limitations. Myers at 86. 
Appellants cite three cases in support of their contention 
that the "discovery rule" should apply to the instant matter. 
The first case cited by Appellant, Becton Dickinson & Co. v. 
Reese, 668 P. 2d 1254 (Utah, 1983), does not support Appellants1 
contention. Appellants are misleading the court in arguing that 
the discovery rule "has been extended to cases in conversion in 
Becton." After reviewing the various exceptions to the discovery 
rule, Utahfs Supreme Court stated, "None of those exceptions is 
applicable to the instant case." Becton at 1257. The discovery 
rule was not applied in Becton. 
The exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the use of the 
discovery rule, as set forth in Becton, are threefold. First, in 
some areas of the law, the discovery rule is incorporated into the 
statute, whereby the statute does not begin to run until the facts 
forming the basis of the cause of action are discovered. Second, 
concealment or misleading acts by a party prevents that party from 
relying on the statue of limitations. Finally where there are 
"exceptional circumstances that would make application of the 
general rule irrational or unjust, this Court has adopted the 
discovery rule by judicial action." Becton at 1257. 
It is obvious that the first two exceptions do not apply to 
the instant case. It is Respondent Calder?s position that the 
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third exception, that of exceptional circumstances, does not apply 
to the instant case either. Appellants never set forth any 
evidence alleging said "exceptional circumstances." 
This Court found that exceptional circumstances existed in 
the case of Myers v. McDonald, supra. However, Myers is 
distinguishable from the instant case. In Myers a wrongful death 
action was brought approximately one year after the statute of 
limitation had lapsed. The guardians of the deceased made several 
attempts to determine the whereabouts of the deceased but were 
unable to locate him. They even read a newspaper article 
concerning the death of a mysterious automobile passenger 
described as being brown haired, 5 feet 8 inches tall, and in his 
early twenties. The deceased was actually blonde, 6 feet 2 inches 
tall and fourteen years of age. The deceased was eventually 
discovered in the morgue through a routine follow-up procedure by 
the police. 
The Court stated that the "exceptional" or "unique 
circumstances" of the case permitted application of the "discovery 
rule." Id at 86, 87. That is, the facts necessary to pursue the 
cause of action were simply not discoverable within the applicable 
time frame because there was no knowledge of a death. Id. The 
Court held that if the guardians were unable to prove "due 
diligence" in their attempts to discover the facts, then the 
statute of limitations would be applicable. Id at 87. 
In the instant case, all the facts necessary to pursue the 
cause of action were available and easily ascertainable in 1972. 
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Respondent Calder did not hide or otherwise conceal his acts. The 
land was available for anyone at anytime to observe and if they 
desired, the Plaintiffs in this action or Appellants could have 
performed another survey. In those cases where the "discovery" 
rule has been accepted, it is usually due to the ability of the 
offending party to conceal from the potential plaintiff facts 
which are crucial to the cause of action. Such is not the 
situation in the case at bar. Respondent Calder has never been in 
a position to mislead or to conceal facts. 
In addition, the instant action was brought fourteen years 
after the accrual of the cause of action rather than three years 
as in Myers, and, pursuant to Section 78-12-25(2), Appellants had 
four years to bring their action rather than two years as in 
Myers. The four year statute of limitation provided Appellants a 
reasonable time in which to discover any negligent acts and is 
applicable where Appellants had reasonable means for knowing or 
obtaining knowledge of the existence of a cause of action through 
the exercise of vigilance in the means within their reach. 
Appellants1 reliance upon Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435 
(Utah, 1968) is also misplaced. The discovery rule was extended 
to medical malpractice in this Christiansen case. However, a 
medical malpractice case is easily distinguished from the present 
case. It appears the plaintiff in Hooper Water Improvement v. 
Reeve, 642 P. 2d 745 (Utah, 1982) had made a similar argument to 
the one Appellants raise; however the court in Hooper stated: 
The plaintiff's case on appeal is based on false syllogistic 
reasoning, since its theme appears to be that because a 
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doctor is a professional man and can be sued for negligence, 
and a consulting engineer is a professional man and likewise 
can be sued for negligence, the fact that the first can be 
sued when the plaintiff discovers a sponge was left in his 
stomach, the latter can be sued when it is discovered sand 
was left in his well. 
Hooper at 746. 
This Court in Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah, 1974) 
responded to such an argument with, "The confidential relationship 
between doctor and patient is different from that between 
contractors and home owners." Good at 225. Likewise, the 
relationship between a land owner and surveyor is substantially 
different from the confidential relationship between doctor and 
patient. The medical malpractice facts of the Christiansen case 
distinguish it from the present case. 
Appellants next argue that parallel with the judicial 
expansion in 1968 in Christiansen and again in 1981 in Myers of 
the discovery rule, there has also been a legislative expansion. 
Respondent Calder first notes that there has not been a recent 
judicial expansion because this Court has not invoked the 
discovery rule in the most recent cases before it: Hooper Water 
Improvement District v. Reeve in 1982, Becton v. Reese in 1983 and 
Brigham Young University v. Paulsen in 1987. 
In Hooper Water Improvement District v. Reeve, this Court 
held that the statute of limitations (applying 78-12-25.5) 
precluded a negligence action against an engineer for negligently 
supervising the construction of a well where the action was 
brought eleven years after construction of the well was completed. 
This Court again refused to apply the discovery rule. 
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In Becton v. Reese, the patent in question was issued five 
years before the defendant had filed his counterclaim and the 
statute governing said matters bars any action brought more than 
three years after the cause of action has accrued. This Court, as 
stated previously, found that none of the exceptions regarding the 
discovery rule applied. 
In Brigham Young v. Paulsen, the court applied the six year 
statute of limitations governing written contracts and found that 
the causes of action against the two contractors accrued at the 
completion of their respective construction contracts. Further, 
the Court found that the discovery rule did not apply as, "We find 
nothing in the present case that warrants use of the discovery 
rule." Brigham Young at 1374. 
Respondent Calder next notes that the legislative expansion 
has certainly not been recent. The statutes cited by Appellants, 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-12-19, 78-12-26(1-3), and 78-12-
27 have been a part of the Utah Code since 1951. Further, in some 
instances, the Legislature has even fixed a maximum period for 
exposure to litigation where the discovery rule has been 
legislatively adopted. For example, under the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations, the cause of action must be brought within 
two years after the plaintiff discovers, or should discover, his 
injury but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged 
act, omission, neglect or occurrence. See Utah Code Annotated § 
78-14-4(1) (1979). 
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The discovery rule is only extended in cases where there is a 
legislative enactment, concealment or fraud on the part of the 
defendant, or exceptional circumstances. Failing these 
exceptions, the discovery rule is not utilized. 
Notably, Appellants never even alleged any facts to support 
an argument for an exception to the discovery rule in the case at 
bar. Again, the discovery rule is inapplicable to the instant 
case. The lower court's determination that the discovery rule 
does not apply should be upheld. 
Point IV: Summary Judgment was Properly Utilized in this Case. 
Appellants contend that Summary Judgment was improper in the 
instant matter as there were "material issues of fact remaining 
involving the question of 1) the appropriate statute of 
limitations to apply, 2) the applicability of the discovery rule." 
(Appellants Brief at p. 7). Both alleged matters of "material 
issues of fact" are, in actuality, issues of law and properly 
determined in summary proceedings. 
Appellants also argue that "It was Respondent's burden to 
produce evidence and it failed to do so. Resopndent [sic] 
produce [sic] plenty of law, but no facts." (Appellants1 Brief at 
7). Appellants state that "the only references to the survey, its 
conclusions, and the date of the signing of the certificate were 
based upon memoranda alone." (Appellants1 Brief at 7). However, 
as stated previously, the Certificate of Survey was referenced in 
the Complaints of Plaintiffs and Appellants and was included in 
the pleadings. (R. 5, 140). There was no dispute regarding the 
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signing of the Certificate of Survey or the date on the 
Certificate. Where pleadings and answers to interrogatories 
disclose undisputed facts which permit resolution of a controversy 
as a matter of law, it is appropriate to enter Summary Judgment. 
Aird Insurance Agency v. Zions First National Bank, 612 P.2d 341 
(Utah, 1980). 
It also appears from Appellants' Brief that Appellants 
contend that if a party argues that the discovery rule should be 
applied, such a determination can only be made at a trial and 
cannot be determined through Summary Judgment. However, actual 
case history establishes that a determination as to the 
applicability of the discovery rule may be dealt with through 
Summary Judgment. Both Becton and Hooper Improvement District 
were Summary Judgment cases. The Brigham Young University case 
was an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings. It appears, 
although it is not clear, that the appeal in Good v. Christensen 
was from a Rule 12(b) motion, dismissing the complaint of 
Plaintiff Good. It is obvious from these cases that arguing the 
applicability of the discovery rule does not prohibit the use of 
Summary Judgment or any remedy similar to Summary Judgment. 
Finally, Appellants never presented any facts to the lower 
court with respect to why Appellants fell within the exceptions 
relating to the discovery rule, nor do they present any arguments 
to this Court as to why the exceptions apply to the case at bar. 
Point V: In the Alternative, Should this Court Find that Section 
78-12-25(2) does not Govern the Instant Matter, Sections 
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78-12-25(1), 78-12-25.5 or 78-12-26(1) Would Likewise 
Bar Appellantsf Cause of Action. 
The lower court dismissed Appellants1 Third Party Complaint 
pursuant to Section 78-12-25(2) as it had been filed after the 
statute of limitations had run. As this Court is required to 
"affirm a trial court's decision whenever we can do so as a proper 
ground, even though it was not the ground on which the trial court 
relied in its ruling," Respondent Calder presents the following 
argument to this Court. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley 
Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah, 1984). 
The issue of which statute governs in the instant action was 
raised in the lower court on numerous occasions. In Respondent 
Calderfs Supplemental Memorandum and Second Supplemental 
Memorandum in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Respondent Calder argued, in the alternative, the applicability of 
several statutes to the instant matter. (R. 101 and 122). 
The first alternative argued by Respondent Calder is Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25.5 related to damages arising from 
the defective improvement to real property. This statute was 
applied in the Hooper Improvement District case wherein the 
complaint alleged negligence on the part of the defendant, a 
consulting engineer, in supervising the construction of a water 
well, pursuant to a contract. Section 78-12-25.5 bars all claims 
filed more than seven years after the completion of construction. 
Should this statute be found to be applicable to the instant 
matter, Appellants' Third Party Complaint would be still be 
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dismissed as this action was filed fourteen years after the survey 
was completed. 
Next, based on the pleadings, there was no written contract 
between Appellants and Respondent Calder. (R. 68). Assuming the 
existence of an oral contract between Appellants and Respondent 
Calder, an alternative applicable statute of limitations is Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25(1). According to Footnote 1 of 
the Brigham Young University case, a cause of action in negligence 
which arises from one's contractual duties adds nothing to one's 
cause of action and certainly does not serve to convert the case 
into a tort action. "A negligent failure to perform contractual 
duties is a breach of contract, not a tort." Brigham Young 
University, at 1372, Footnote 1. And, just as an owner's claim 
for negligent construction accrues on the date the construction is 
complete, a owner's claim for the alleged negligence to properly 
survey and locate the subject property accrues on the date the 
survey is complete. Therefore, should Section 78-12-25(1), which 
requires actions based on oral contracts to be brought within four 
years after accrual, apply to the instant case, Appellants' cause 
of action is once again time barred pursuant to the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
Finally, Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-26(1) may be 
found to apply to the instant case. Section 78-12-26(1) applies 
to actions for injury to real property and said Section requires 
actions to be brought within three years after they accrue. As 
the alleged cause of action arose fourteen years prior to the 
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filing of the action, the cause of action would have to be 
dismissed against Respondent Calder for Appellants' failure to 
file the action in a timely manner. 
Irrespective of the statute selected, Appellants' claim is 
time barred by the running of the statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The cause of action cited in Appellants' Third Party 
Complaint is for negligence. The lower court appropriately ruled 
that actions for negligence are governed by Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-12-25(2). Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26(3) does 
not apply to this matter. 
The lower court also correctly ruled that the last act 
necessary to complete the alleged cause of action was Calder?s 
signing of the survey in May, 1972. As the instant action was not 
commenced until May, 1986, fourteen years after the "last act," 
the running of the statute of limitations barred Appellants' claim 
and the Third Party Complaint was appropriately dismissed by the 
lower court. Likewise, the lower court appropriately ruled that 
the discovery rule did not apply to the instant matter. 
Therefore, Respondent Calder respectfully requests this court 
to uphold the ruling of the lower court and rule that Appellants' 
Third Party Complaint was appropriately dismissed pursuant to the 
running of the statute of limitations. 
In the alternative, Respondent Calder requests this court to 
rule that Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25(1), Section 78-
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12-25.5 or Section 78-12-26(1) applies to this case and bars 
Appellants1 claim. 
DATED this 27th day of January, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert F. Babcock 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this •? / " day of January, 1989, I 
caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to Ephraim 
Fankhauser, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 
8 4 1 1 1 . 
tihk /? Jthh± 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROLD 
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EUGENE E . KIGHTLY, HELEN L . 
KIGHTLY, e t a l . , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
R U L I N G 
< i 
flLuu 
hDlSTRlCTCOURTDUCHES 
JUiU?1S:7 
riOGERK.MHHfcT'1, Clerk 
0> 
Civil No. 86-CV-68D 
The Court, having fully considered the pleadings and the 
memoranda, and having now agreed to reconsider Third Party 
Defendants Motion for Summar Judgment hereby enters its ruling. 
Based upon the pleadings and memoranda of Third Party 
Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the cause of action is one for 
negligence. As such, it must have been commenced within four (4) 
years as set forth in Section 78-12-25(2) UCA. The Court finds 
that the last action necessary to complete the cause of action 
was Calder's signing of the survey which action occurred in May 
of 1972. This action was not commenced until May 1986. The 
Court further rules that the "discovery11 requirement of Section 
78-12-26(3) does not apply to a cause of action in negligence. 
Therefore, the Court's previous ruling is set aside and 
O.i* b 
Third Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
and the Third Party Complaint is dismissed. 
DATED this / 7 day of June, 198 7. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Rick J. Sutherland 
E. H. Fankhauser 
Robert F. Babcock 
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Certificate of Survey 
I, Glen H. Caldor, do hereby certify that I am 
a Registered Land Surveyor in the State of Utah, and 
that the plat described hereon portrays a survey made 
by n:.» or under my direction. I further certify that 
the above plat correctly shows the true dimensions of 
the property surveyed and of the improvements located 
ther«ion; and further that there are no encroachments 
on said property. ... , . . 
Glen IV. Calder 
RANGE 
8 W. 
OATE 
5-15-72 
SCALE 
r* 400' 
WILSON a CALDER 
CONSULTING ENGINEERS AND SURVEYORS 
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